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Fearing Hell As Essential
to Validity of Affidavit
By FRANK SWANCARA*
Applicable case law is conflicting on the proposition that any affi-
davit can be legally assailed and judicially declared a nullity where it is
found that the affiant does not fear that deposing falsely would result in
divine punishments after death. Assuming that some old cases are con-
trolling or persuasive authority, one bounded by adversaries and intend-
ing to make an affidavit affecting them ought, as a precautionary measure,
to publicly profess the protective beliefs, agreeing for example, with the
doctrine, invoked by Judge Jefferies,' concerning "eternal flames" and
"the bottomless lake of fire and brimstone." The reason is that an oath
or affirmation is part of an affidavit, and at common law there can be no
oath unless the person attempting to make it has some belief in divine
punishments for infidelity to an oath. A Connecticut court 2 would not
permit Mr. Scott to take the oath as a witness because what be believed
was "that men were punished in this life for their sins." A New York
court' announced the rule that no one is a competent witness, or oath
taker, unless he believes in divine punishments-"in the world to come."
The New York court did not explain the mode -and duration of the
punishment "in the world to come," but possibly there was a silent
agreement with Jonathan Edwards, mentioned here because quoted in a
New Hampshire opinion.
4
One of the old cases seals a blow even to the theory that the Bill
of Rights grants to everyone the "privilege or capacity" of taking an oath,
making an affidavit, etc., without regard to his opinions on theological
subjects. The Ohio judges7 seized upon the clause, which we also have
in Section 4 of our Bill of Rights, providing that "the liberty of con-
science hereby secured shall not be construed'to dispense with oaths and
affirmations." They held that a person disqualified under the common
law to make an oath, becauae of absence of belief in divine punishments,
remains disqualified, and in spite of the fact that th Constitution also
*Of the Denver Bar.
'Quoted in Section 1816_, Wigmore on Ev. (2d-ed.). The judge said: "* * *
that God of Heaven may justly strike thee into eternal flames and make thee drop into
the bottomless lake-of fire and brimstone, if thou offer to deviate the least from the
truth * * *"
2 Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66 (1828).
'Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 103 (1820).
'Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 7, 163, where the court quoted Edwards thus: "The
God who holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider or some loathsome
insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked. * "* * The sight of hell-
torments will exalt the happiness of the saints for ever. * * *"
'Clinton v. The State, 33 Ohio St. 27 (1877).
DICTA 145
provided that no person is incompetent as a witness "on account of his
religious belief." They assumed that a constitutional retention of
"oaths and affirmations" is a retention also of all the common law requi-
sites for competency to make an oath.
The Ohio decision, a scarecrow in the field of case law, need not,
as yet, terrorize anyone, for there is much persuasive authority to the
effect that any person may take an oath, and be a witness or affiant, with-
out regard to his opinions, under a Bill of Rights like ours, which pro-
vides that "no person shall be denied any * * * privilege or capacity, on
account of his opinions concerning religion.'' 6 The question is still un-
settled, for in 1883 our legislature acted as if uncertain whether the Bill
of Rights already fully protected witnesses, and passed an act providing
that no persons "shall be excluded" as witnesses "on account of their
opinions on matters of religious belief. " In a sense, affiants too are
''witnesses," but the act as a whole shows that the legislative intent was
to liberate only those who are "witnesses" in the ordinary sense; that is,
those who testify orally or by deposition in a judicial proceeding. The
same is true of the territorial act of 1872, concerning competency of
witnesses."
The distinction between "witness" and "affiant" was recognized
in a case where it was held that a free man of color, incompetent as a
witness against a white man, could, as "incident to his freedom," make
an affidavit in a proceeding to compel a white man to give a peace bond.9
Suppose that in Colorado a citizen makes affidavit before a Justice of the
Peace, deposing that someone threatens to do bodily harm. The J. P.,
having taken an oath to support the Constitution (which preserves oaths
and affirmations), can cross-examine the complainant, and if he finds
that the latter does not fear "the bottomless lake of fire and brimstone,"
he can, according to the reasoning in some opinions, ignore the complaint
and refuse to issue a warrant, for there is no oath, the affiant being in-
capable of making one under the common law. Where there is no oath
or affirmation, there is no affidavit. Charles Bradlaugh had in fact said
and performed all that was possible in the making and subscribing of
an oath as a member of the House of Commons, yet because he had no
fear of "future punishments," the court held that he had made no oath
and was incapable of making one. 10 He was prosecuted and penalized
'Hronek v. People, 134 Ill. 139, 24 N. E. 861, 23 A. S. R. 652, 8 L. R. A. 837:
Perry's Case, 3 Gratt. (Va.) 632: Bush v. Com., 80 Ky. 244: People v. Copsey, 71
Cal. 548, 12 Pac. 721; McClellan v. Owens (Mo.), 74 S. W. 2d 570, 95 A. L. R.
724, and note.
'Sec. 1, Ch. 177, C. S. A.
8Sec. 7, Ch. 177, C. S. A.
9Com. v. Oldham, 1 Dana (Ky.) 466.
"Attorney General v. Bradlaugh, 14 Q. B. D. (1885) 667. Same reasoning in
Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362 (1841).
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for having voted without first having made and subscribed the oath re-
quired of a member of Parliament.
By way of dictum an Illinois court said that one incompetent as a
witness "may take official oaths, and make ex parte affidavits,"" because
there is no one who can object to competency. There could, however,
be an objecting party if the affidavit is made in the course of an adversary
proceeding. Moreover, if Bradlaugh's case is still the law, it is possible
for the officer who administers oaths to refuse to administer it to a per-
son not believing in "future punishments," or if the oath is adminis-
tered, then the public official to whom the affidavit is presented may
refuse to recognize it as such. Under the reasoning of Bradlaugh's case,
there is a vacancy in any public office where the incumbent, at the time
he took the oath of office, concurred in Bradlaugh's opinions and was,
therefore, incapable of taking an oath according to the common law.
He could not even verify a pleading.
It has been held that an "infamous" person may make an affidavit,
because to hold otherwise would be "a denial of justice.' 2  But judges
were not so considerate of persons, not "infamous" but having opinions
differing from their.own. The expressions "utter want of moral sensi-
bility,"'2 and "grossest moral depravity,' 14 were used against such per-
sons. A complainant from whom goods were stolen was not permitted
to testify against the thief because he, the victim, believed God and Na-
ture to be equivalents.15 A child criminally assaulted was held incompe-
tent to testify because she did not understand, and therefore did not
profess, the doctrine of "future punishments." '  While nearly all the
case law in point deals with witnesses in a court room, it was recognized
that the same rules apply also to affiants.
1 7
.Litigants desire to use as witnesses those who know the facts.
Hence, constitutional and statutory provisions liberate all prospective
witnesses. But most affiants swear only for their own purposes, and for
this reason may have been overlooked when new written law was made.
They are plainly omitted in the clause of the Iowa, Minnesota, Texas
and Wisconsin constitutions, which provide that "no person shall be
* * * rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity,
in consequence of his opinions on the subject of religion." In Wyoming
the clause uses the words "serve as a witness,' ' 1 which would exclude an
affiant.
"The Central, etc. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 11. 541, 554 (1856).
"Ritter v. Stutts, 8 Ired. (N. C.) 240 (1852).'Odell v. Koppee, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 88 (1871).
"Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 265 (1859).
'U. S. v. Lee, Fed. Cas. No. 15,586.
8Beason v. State, 72 Ala. 191 (1882).
7Leonard v. Manard, I N. Y. Super. (1 Hall's Rep.) 200 (1828).
"Sec. 18, Art. I, providing "* * * no person shall be rendered incompetent to
* * serve as a witness or juror, because of his opinion on any matter of religious
belief whatever; * * *-
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It is popularly supposed that anyone may make an "affirmation."
If so, still an invalid oath could not be converted into a valid affirmation.
But a person not fearing supernatural punishments is as much disquali-
fied to make an affirmation as he is to take an oath. 19 That is the case
law. Our statute permits affirmations only where the "person shall have
conscientious scruples against taking the oath. " 26 This was modeled
after such foreign statutes as had the intent not to relax the rule requir-
ing fear of "future punishments," but to accommodate Quakers, Nicol-
ites, Tunkers and Mennonists 2 1 or "Quakers and the like, ' '2 2 who believe
that the divine command is to "Swear not at all." Only in Florida
does the statute clearly permit affirmations by "all persons who do not
believe in the doctrine of future rewards and punishments" 2 3  In Eng-
land the whole situation was remedied, possibly as the result of Brad-
laugh's case, 2 4 by a statute which provided that "every person * * *
stating * * * that he has no religious belief, * * * shall be permitted to
make his solemn affirmation * * * in all places and for all purposes
where an oath is or shall be required by law, * * *"25
Civil Procedure Rule 43 (d) permits "a solemn affirmation" in any
proceeding under the rule. The implications of the word "solemn" are
conflicting, but since it was also used in the English statute, affecting
persons with "no religious belief," it can be so applied here. But there
is found judicial expression which would support the thesis that a person
not fearing hell is legally incapable of making either oath or affirmation
before a Justice of the Peace, or as part of an affidavit in connection with
an initiative and referendum petition. In other words, there are many
situations where a public official may ignore an affidavit, as if it did not
exist, just as the prosecutors of Charles Bradlaugh regarded his written
oath as no oath at all, if the common law applied against him is the
common law existing here and was not abrogated by Section 4 of our
Bill of Rights. Our local courts have not yet declared whether they
agree with the Illinois opinion, 2 which would free all affiants from mo-
lestation, thus giving vitality to the Bill of Rights, or with the judicial
waif in Ohio,2 7 which would continue the common law disability based
on private opinions on theological matters.
"Leonard v. Manard, supra, note 17.
'Sec. 2, Ch. 115, C. S.A. 1935.
'Ch. 71, sec. 3. Compl. Sts. D. C. 1894.
'Samford, J., in Wright v. State, 24 Ala. App. 378, 135 So. 636, 640 (1931).
'R. S. 1919, Sec. 2703, as quoted in 3 Wigmore on Ev. (2d ed.) 880.
Supra, note-le.
'51-52 Vict., Ch. 46, Sec. 1, quoted 3 Wigmore on Ev. (2d ed.) 877.
'Hronek v. People, supra, note 6.
'Clinton v. The State, supra, note 5, cited by annotator of Sec. 89-1701 R. S.
Wyo. 1931 as if still applicable in Wyoming.
